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COMMENTS
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS-REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP,
PARTNERSHIP ASSOCIATION OR THE CORPORATION-
SELECTION OF THE SUITABLE FORM
IN PENNSYLVANIA.
In Pennsylvania there is no statute which expressly provides for the
creation of a close corporation. This may present many perplexing prob-
lems for the attorney retained to initiate an organization wherein the finan-
cial and managerial interests are concentrated in a few persons. At the
time of consulting a lawyer the parties are usually in perfect harmony as
to all questions that arise, and nothing is seen but a successful, blissful
venture continuing far into the future. However, time and experience
have shown that the great cordiality within the group does not always
continue; therefore, provisions which will receive the sanction of the courts
must be made in order to protect the interest of the parties concerned. Thus
arises the need for the selection of a proper form by which to conduct the
business.
Typically the arrangement will involve one party's contributing con-
siderably more capital, and thus having control over the administration of
the business while the other party is to devote his full time to the technical
and productive aspect of the enterprise. Of course, major decisions should
be agreed to by all parties and some arrangement for salaries and the dis-
tribution of profits should be made.
A general partnership agreement would certainly answer the demand
in the above-mentioned situation. But, assuming the clients are anxious
to acquire limited liability as offered by the corporate form, the legal
practitioner often finds himself in something of a dilemma. The Business
Corporation Law is not particularly suited to our proposed organization;
it was apparently drafted with the large public corporation in mind. There-
fore, unless great care is taken in drawing up the organizational papers,
the minority is likely to find itself at the mercy of the majority if the initial
harmony ceases to exist.
It is the purpose of this Comment to examine some of the pitfalls of
the corporate form in regard to a close corporation and to suggest the
Registered Partnership and the Partnership Association, as two possible
forms of association by which the difficulties inherent in a close corporation
may possibly be avoided.
(385)
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I.
LIMITED LIABILITY.
The classic form used in obtaining limited liability is the corporation.
A shareholder of a business corporation is not personally liable for any debt
or liability of the corporation, except salaries and wages due and owing
to its employees.' Similarly, a shareholder is under no liability to the
corporation with respect to his holdings, other than the obligation of
complying with the terms of the subscription agreement. 2  In this connec-
tion, a limitation of practical consequence which must be remembered is
the considerable formality involved in complying with all the intricate
statutory requisites concerning articles of incorporation, by-laws, meetings,
stock issues and subscriptions. The act is silent as to the effect of non-
compliance on limited liability, although it does provide for proceedings
by the commonwealth to dissolve, wind up, or terminate a corporation
which has been formed without a substantial compliance with the conditions
prescribed by the act.8 Faulty incorporation not resulting in the existence
of a de facto corporation might well leave the subscribers open to unlimited
liability.
The statutory requirements for the registered partnership, which also
affords limited liability, are considerably less formal and involved. As
soon as two or more persons have formed the partnership, recorded their
agreement with the recorder of deeds 4 and published notice of the formation
in the proper periodical,' no member is thereafter liable for partnership
debts save to the amount of his subscription." In order to preserve this
limited liability, the partnership must keep posted at its principal office, in
a place accessible to the public, a list of the partners with the amount of
capital subscribed by each and the amount paid in by each partner; further-
more, the words "Limited Liability" must follow the name of each partner.
This notice must also state the volume and page of the record in which the
articles of partnership appear in the office of the recorder of deeds.7 In
addition, the words "Limited Liability" must appear on partnership signs,
letterheads and other publications where the names of the several partners
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-601 (Supp. 1956). Suit by an employee of the
corporation may be had against one shareholder without joining all the shareholders,
and this has been held not to violate the equal protection of the laws clause of the
Federal Constitution. Eiffert v. Pennsylvania Central Brewing Co., 141 Pa. Super.
543, 15 A.2d 723 (1940).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-609 (Supp. 1956).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-207 (Supp. 1956). Where formation was found
to be a sham in that no meetings were held, friends were named as directors or no
money was paid for stock, a wife of the owner was permitted to reach corporate
assets for support payments, Sheckter v. Sheckter, 366 Pa. 76 A.2d 753 (1951). They
may also be reached to pay taxes on property owned by the predominant stockholder.
Great Oak Building & Loan Ass'n v. Rosenhiem, 341 Pa. 132, 19 A.2d 95 (1941).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 242 (Supp. 1956).
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 244 (Supp. 1056).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 261 (Supp. 1956).
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 265 (Supp. 1956).
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appear." A violation of any of these requirements would seem to result
in a loss of limited liability and is also a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
of not less than one hundred dollars, but not exceeding five hundred
dollars .'
The members of a partnership association, like stockholders and regis-
tered partners, are afforded limited liability.10 The association is required
to keep a "subscription list" book which must be open to creditors and
members of the partnership at all reasonable times." Failure to keep this
book will render the members liable as general partners. 12 The statute also
requires that the word "Limited" be the concluding word of the partnership
name which is placed on all signs and documents. Its omission will render
all participants who had knowledge or who acquiesced liable for any in-
debtedness, damage, or liability arising therefrom.' 3 This privilege of
limited liability can be assured to the members of the association only by a
literal compliance with the formalities set forth in the act.'
4
II.
DELECTUS PERSONAE.
The owners of a typical small business organization are understandably
concerned with any arrangements which would change or restrict share
holdings.
In Pennsylvania it is very difficult to limit membership in a corporation
in the same manner as a partnership. An agreement among shareholders
not to sell or transfer their stock without the unanimous consent of all the
persons signing the agreement is a restraint on alienation and void as against
public policy. 5 The same would seem to follow for a by-law imposing
a similar restriction. On the other hand, a stockholders' agreement or
by-law may provide that existing stockholders have an option to purchase
the share of a retiring or deceased stockholder, or simply the shares of a
stockholder desiring to sell.' 6  Such a provision is not a restraint on
alienation 17 and is in effect a contract between the corporation and the
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 266 (Supp. 1956).
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 267 (Supp. 1956).
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 341 (Supp. 1956).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 381 (Supp. 1956).
12. First National Bank v. Creveling, 177 Pa. 270, 35 Atl. 595 (1896).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 382 (Supp. 1956) ; Abington Dairy v. Reynolds, 24
Pa. Super. 632 (1904) "Ltd." is a substantial compliance.
14. Shebe v. Strong, 128 Pa. 315, 18 Atl. 397 (1889) (failure to sufficiently
describe property taken for shares) ; Eliot v. Himrod, 108 Pa. 569 (1885) (no sub-
scription list book).
15. White v. Ryan, 15 Pa. C.C. 170 (C.P. Lyc. 1894).
16. Wand v. Blum, 309 Pa. 551, 164 Atl. 596 (1932) ; In re Lindsay's Estate,
210 Pa. 224, 59 Atl. 1074 (1904) ; Fitzsimmons v. Lindsay, 205 Pa. 79, 54 Atl. 488
(1903) ; Garrett v. Philadelphia Lawn Mower, 39 Pa. Super. 78 (1909); Chrisman
v. Avils Inc., 80 Pa. D & C 395 (C.P. Del. 1953).
17. Ibid.
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shareholders, and among the shareholders themselves. Such a by-law
could be made repealable only with the consent of all the shareholders.' 8
A provision in the by-laws or in an agreement between the various
stockholders calling for preemptive rights as to unissued corporate shares
is ineffective. 19 Such a provision may be established only by the articles
of incorporation.2 0  However, it cannot affect the rights of a purchaser
unless the fact of the restriction is conspicuously noted on its face 1.2
It is apparent from the foregoing that persons using the corporate form
in a close organization may well find themselves involved with difficult
problems of ownership. Although some protection is afforded members
of a close corporation by providing for the so-called "right of first refusal,"
they may not absolutely prohibit the transfer of shares. Still greater prob-
lems exist with respect to the authorization of new shares. Assuming that
a corporation had issued all of its authorized stock, it would be necessary
to amend the articles of incorporation in order to provide for additional
shares.2 2 In order to guard against the possibility of undesired issues, the
members may provide, in the articles of incorporation, for unanimous
consent of the shareholders to amend the articles ; 23 otherwise the majority
may freely amend under authority of the statute. Under a recent Penn-
sylvania decision, such a provision might be looked upon as vesting a prop-
erty right in all shareholders and requiring consent of all parties whose
rights are affected.2 4 As to shares authorized but not issued, the statute
gives power to the board of directors to issue such shares, but the articles or
by-laws may limit this.2 5 In regard to the ability to restrict membership
by controlling the issuance or authorization the practitioner who chooses
the corporate form is once again faced with uncertainty. In order for
minority members to appraise accurately their strength in a newly-formed
corporation, all authorized shares should be issued at the outset. In the
event a person enters the business after it has commenced operations, he
should request a preemptive right as to the unissued shares. Of course, this
will remedy the situation only if he is financially able to purchase.
The interest of a registered partner, on the other hand, is personal
property and may be transferred, sold or assigned under rules prescribed
by a vote of the majority in number and interest of the partners. In the
absence of such a provision the transferee of any interest is not entitled
to participate in the subsequent business of the partnership unless elected
18. Bechtol v. Coleman Realty Co., 367 Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661 (1951).
19. Chrisman v. Avils Inc., 80 Pa. D & C 395 (C.P. Del. 1953).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-611 (Supp. 1956).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12a, § 8-204 (Supp. 1956).
22. PA. CONST. art. XVI, § 7 ("the stock and indebtedness of corporations shall
not be increased except in pursuance of general law, nor without the consent of the
persons holding the larger amount in value of the stock, first obtained at a meeting to
be held after sixty days notice given in pursuance of law").
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-805 (Supp. 1956).
24. Metzger v. George Washington Memorial Park, 380 Pa. 350, 110 A.2d 425(1955).
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-601 (Supp. 1956).
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as a partner.26 Any such change in the ownership of an interest, not fol-
lowed by an election to membership or covered by rules of the organization,
entitles the transferee only to the book value of the interest acquired.27
This value is determined by the partnership at the close of each calendar
year and is conclusive and final on all members and subsequent transferees.2 8
It is also important to note that in cases where there are more than two
partners, the transfer of any interest will not dissolve the partnership, nor
will the partnership be dissolved by reason of the death of any partner,
unless the articles so provide. If there are two partners, the organization
would of course terminate on the death of one partner. In the event there
are more than two partners, the value of the interest can be paid to the
personal representative of the deceased partner and the partnership may
continue to operate. The parties are also protected against a transfer by
one of the members, as previously noted, simply by operation of the
statute.
2 9
Thus, it would seem that the registered partnership is well suited to
preserving one's right of selecting his business associates. The only major
problem is that of introducing new members into the organization over
the protest of the minority because of the ability of the majority in number
and interest to elect transferees to membership by virtue of the statute.
Increased facility in achieving a closed organization is also offered
by the partnership association. As in the registered partnership, the in-
terest is personal property and may be transferred. However, the trans-
feree is only entitled to the value of the interest acquired, unless the partners
have provided otherwise in the articles of association. Determination of the
value may be agreed upon by the parties or the partnership or the transferee
may petition the court of common pleas for the appointment of an appraiser
to make the determination."0 Such appraisal after approval by the court
is conclusive and a transferee cannot maintain an action for dividends unless
he has been elected to membership.31 Even in the case of an existing mem-
ber acquiring additional shares, it would be permissible for a partnership
association to adopt a rule prohibiting such member from increasing his
participation in the subsequent business or profits of the association or to
vote upon the additional shares unless elected to membership as to his
newly acquired interest.3
2
The danger with the partnership association lies in the fact that the
statute provides for an increase in the capital stock by a majority of the
members.33 This, in addition to the ability of a majority of the partners
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 269 (Supp. 1956).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 270 (Supp. 1956).
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 189 (Supp. 1956).
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 269 (Supp. 1956).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 383 (Supp. 1956).
31. Kopyscianski v. Russian Mercantile Ass'n, Ltd., 3 Northum. L.J. 113 (C.P. Pa.
1917).
32. Carter v. Producers Oil Co., 182 Pa. 551, 38 Atl. 571 (1897).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 344 (Supp. 1956).
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to elect new members,8 4 could make it difficult for a minority member to
retain his interest, both managerial and financial. Since the partners have
an election to increase the capital stock it would not seem contrary to the
statute to provide in the agreement against such an increase, or perhaps
existing partners could be given the first opportunity to purchase the new
stock. However, the latter would be unsatisfactory to a minority partner
financially unable to buy. By providing against an increase in capital stock,
the association appears to be closed to others except for the fact that a
majority in number and interest is able to elect new members. In this
respect the partnership association and the registered partnership fail to
protect adequately the interest of a minority partner.
III.
THE CONTROL OF MANAGEMENT.
It is the explicit command of the Business Corporation Law that the
business and affairs of every business corporation shall be managed by a
board of directors. 5 This creates a great area of difficulty in a close cor-
poration concerning the delegation of management to the person who has
agreed to contribute his knowledge and experience to the operation of the
business. Generally, it is the desire of all the persons involved that this
individual have day-to-day control of particular phases of the operation.
The extent of such control creates the problem. Only general supervisory
power may be delegated by the board.36 What constitutes general super-
visory power depends on the particular circumstances, but the power is
usually coextensive with the business entrusted to the manager.
8 7
A similar problem exists with regard to general management by the
board of directors. One author has described a close corporation as
"an enterprise in corporate form in which management and ownership
are substantially identical. As a result of the identity, the participants
consider themselves 'partners' and seek to conduct the corporate affairs
to a greater or lesser extent in the manner of a partnership." 8
Where three or four persons hold all the outstanding stock it is relatively
simple to insure the minority of a vote on the board of directors by the use
of cumulative voting8 9 or voting trusts. 40  In such a situation management
is in the owners and the problems of majority voting are similar to those
in any organization. Whether a by-law requiring unanimous action by
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 383 (Supp. 1956).
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-401 (Supp. 1956).
36. William Sellers Co. v. Clarke-Harrison, Inc., 354 Pa. 109, 46 A.2d 497 (1946)
(the case dealt with a managing corporation rather than an individual manager, but
the same principle would apply).
37. Farneth v. Commercial Credit Co., 313 Pa. 433, 169 Atl. 89 (1933).
38. Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488 (1948).
39. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-505 (Supp. 1956).
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-511 (Supp. 1956).
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either directors or shareholders would meet with judicial approval is un-
certain. From the reading of the statute, it is at least arguable that such a
by-law would be proper. The statutory provision calling for a majority of
a quorum of directors to transact business is prefaced by the words "Except
as otherwise provided in the by-laws." 41 As to shareholders, the statute
specifies majority action unless the articles or by-laws provide otherwise. 42
In addition, the articles may require a greater vote than a majority in
amending the articles of incorporation. 43
One of the leading cases on this question, a New York decision, 44 held
that a by-law requiring unanimous action by directors or shareholders was
contrary to the corporation law of that state. The result of the case was a
statutory amendment permitting such a by-law by use of the phrase "such
number greater than a majority . . ." 45
In any event the minority director and owner, as has been noted, is
afforded some protection through the use of cumulative voting. Assurance
of the same degree of control could be obtained by issuing different classes
of stock to the shareholders and requiring a majority vote of each class to
increase the number of directors.46 In addition, when a bona fide complaint
is made by a minority stockholder concerning the management of the affairs
of a corporation, a court of equity should not hesitate to strike down ar-
rangements by which the holders of the majority of the stock seek in-
definitely to perpetuate their individual control at the expense of the cor-
poration itself and the other stockholders. 47
Another matter of prime importance is the job security of the minority
member who is to conduct the operation. A manager holds office at the
pleasure of the directors and may be removed by them without cause.48
If the majority controls the board, his continued position as manager is not
assured. Such a person may enter a shareholders' agreement whereby his
associates agree to his being retained by the company, or he may contract
to the same effect with the corporation. It is advisable to limit the period
of employment to a reasonable number of years and to refrain from specify-
ing a particular position. Otherwise, the courts might frown on such a
contract as an interference with the discretion of the directors. 49
The registered partnership presents a very favorable picture for the
prospective associates with regard to the management of the business.
They may adopt such by-laws, rules, and regulations as a majority in inter-
est may see fit to adopt, including the designation of official positions and
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-402 (Supp. 1956).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-503 (Supp. 1956).
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-805 (Supp. 1956).
44. Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 159 (1945).
45. N.Y. STOCK CORP., §9.
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-601 (Supp. 1956).
47. Dickinson v. C.F. Heller Bindery, 45 Pa. D & C 394 (C.P. Berks 1942).
48. Brindley v. Walker, 221 Pa. 287, 70 Atl. 794 (1908).
49. Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 199 N.E. 641 (1936) (represents the weight
of authority in the United States).
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the establishment of the powers and duties of the respective officers in
transacting partnership affairs. 50
As was previously mentioned, one of the parties frequently has little
or no capital but is willing to contribute his knowledge and manageriai
skill to the operation of the enterprise. His primary interests, therefore, are
the guarantee of employment and a relatively free hand in management.
Under this form of partnership, the partners may provide that only certain
members shall have active charge of the business and be authorized to enter
into contracts, undertakings, or engagements binding the partnership. Such
a provision may be changed if the partners see fit. It is interesting to note
that the statutory section does not require a majority of the members to
make such a change, 51 while the preceding section 12 dealing with the
general conduct of the business refers to a majority in number and interest
of the partners. If this section were interpreted to require consent of all
the partners, the managing partner would be assured protection.
The internal management of the partnership association, on the other
hand, is similar to that of the corporation. The statute requires at least
one meeting a year. At one of the meetings the board of managers of the
association, whose number may not be less than three nor more than five,53
are elected by ballot, in person or by proxy, by a majority in value of
interest of the voting members.5 4 The powers of the association are vested
in these managers, and all members are bound by a proper exercise of their
powers. 55 However, where a manager exceeds his authority as provided
by the articles of association, the partnership is not bound by such acts.56
The board is authorized to fix the salaries and compensation of the officers,
even though an officer might be one of the managers. Certain restrictions,
however, are placed on the salaries of the president, secretary, and treas-
urer.'57 It is apparent that the interest of a minority member is not as well
protected in the partnership association as might be wished. The owners
of the business have control insofar as they elect the managers and, of
course, they may occupy these positions themselves. By the vote of a
majority in number and interest of its members, the partnership association
can adopt by-laws for the regulation of the association. The management
is centralized in the board of managers and, unless all owners are on the
board, some will have no voice in the operation of the business. This, of
course, is not desirable for one wishing to keep close watch on the use of
his money.
50. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 262 (Supp. 1956).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 263 (Supp. 1956).
52. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 262 (Supp. 1956).
53. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 401 (Supp. 1956).
54. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 403 (Supp. 1956).
55. Jennings v. Beale, 146 Pa. 125, 23 Atl. 225 (1892) ; Pittsburgh Melting Co. v.
Rees, 118 Pa. 355, 12 Atl. 362 (1888).
56. Bernard v. Leas Manufacturing Co., 64 Fed. 30 (3d Cir. 1894).
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 401 (Supp. 1956).
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The declaration of dividends is at the discretion of the majority of the
managers, although they may not diminish or impair the stated capital.58
One or more of the managers may contract for the association or incur
liability. However, no liability greater than five hundred dollars will bind
the association unless reduced to writing and signed by at least two man-
agers."9 These provisions must be strictly complied with to render the
firm liable for any indebtedness beyond five hundred dollars, 0 although
a proper subsequent ratification will be binding."1 It is readily seen that
this board of managers is analogous to the corporation's board of directors.
The owners elect both groups and the management of the respective enter-
prises is in the board.
IV.
TAXATION.
Obviously the lawyer of today must consider the tax consequences of
the choice of one form of business organization over another. It is often a
difficult decision which involves a consideration of the current tax rates and
estimated profit of the enterprise. Taxation is- an area where adequate
treatment demands specialized knowledge. The purpose here is simply to
point to a few factors which should be considered in selecting a given form
of business organization.
While the corporation is always taxable as such, there are circum-
stances where a partnership is likely to be taxed as a corporation. This
extension of corporate taxes to unincorporated entities is within the con-
stitutional powers of the Congress."
In Morissey v. Commissioner,6 the Supreme Court of the United
States indicated the areas of similarity justifying taxing an unincorporated
business entity as a corporation. These areas have been summarized as
follows:
1. title to the property held by the entity.
2. centralized management.
3. continuity uninterrupted by deaths among the beneficial owners or
by transfers of interest.
4. limitation on the personal liability of the parties.6 4
Furthermore, subsequent cases have held that all of the above elements
need not be present to incur the corporate tax.6"
58. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 384 (Supp. 1956).
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 401 (Supp. 1956).
60. Mercantile Bank v. Lauth, 143 Pa. 53, 21 Atl. 1017 (1891).
61. Porter v. Beacon Construction Co., 154 Pa. 8, 26 Atd. 216 (1893).
62. Burk-Waggoner Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925).
63. 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
64. Commissioner v. Rector and Davidson, 111 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1940).
65. Pennsylvania Co. v. United States, 138 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. den.
321 U.S. 788 (1944).
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It is clear that any decision on the question of how the enterprise
should be taxed must depend upon an examination of the particular facts.
However, one annotator has stated that a partnership association of the
type authorized by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, having, by virtue
of the statutory provisions under which it was organized, the characteristics
essential to an association within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code,
is taxable as a corporation.66 While the annotator does not mention the
registered partnership, it would also seem to possess these characteristics
and, therefore, be taxable as a corporation.
In addition to the four corporate attributes, the cases and regulations
promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service mention various other less
important corporate indicia. With regard to such "technical arrangements
or devices" as corporate officers, seals, stock certificates and meetings the
regulations provide that "they serve to emphasize the fact that an organiza-
tion possessing them should be treated as a corporation." 07
It should also be remembered that under the Internal Revenue Code
certain partnerships may elect to be taxed as corporations. 8 This does not
change the law with respect to unincorporated associations having cen-
tralized control and management, etc. Such associations are still taxed as
corporations regardless of any election.69
The Code should be carefully analyzed before making such an election.
There are various qualifying factors, such as, capital requirements and cer-
tain effects which follow the election. For example, the tax on self-
employment income still applies to the members of the partnership and
the electing enterprise will be subject to the regular corporate normal
tax and surtax,70 the tax on accumulated earnings 71 and the alternative
tax for capital gains. 72 The most important factor to be remembered is
that once the election is made, it cannot be revoked unless there is a change
in ownership. 73
Under Pennsylvania taxing statutes there is no difference in treatment
between the corporation, registered partnership or the partnership associa-
tion.
The Pennsylvania capital stock and franchise taxes are imposed on
partnerships which bear the fundamental aspects of a corporation. This
has been applied to both types of partnerships under discussion.7 4  The
same tax classification also applies in the application of the state corporate
net income tax.
75
66. 4 C.C.H. 1957 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 1 5962.01.
67. Vernon, When are Partnerships Likely to be Taxed as Associations, N.Y.U.
7TH INST. ON FED. TAX.
68. INT. REv. CODE OP 1954, § 1361.
69. 4 C.C.H. 1957 STAND. FED. TAX REP. f" 4846.01.
70. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 11.
71. Id. § 531.
72. Id. § 1201.
73. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1361.
74. 1 C.C.H. STATE TAX REP. (Pa.) ff 5-104 (1957).
75. 1 id. 1 10-102 (It should be noted that if one were willing to sacrifice the
benefits of limited liability and control of management, certain benefits might be
[VOL. 2.
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V.
CONCLUSION.
The foregoing considerations of the Pennsylvania tax laws probably
explains the almost complete failure to use these two forms of partnerships
as evidenced by the lack of decisions interpreting the various statutory
sections. This may also explain the results of a survey taken by Professor
E. R. Latty of the Duke University Law School among graduates of that
institution practicing in Pennsylvania. The survey concerned the use of
the partnership association. Without exception, the answers received were
to the effect that, in their experience, resort was had always to the cor-
poration law, never to the partnership statute. 7
6
As for drafting, the nature of the small business enterprise makes it
difficult to form a guide that will apply in each case. It is only after a
careful investigation of the needs of the business and the persons involved
that a decision can be made. However, wherever the federal tax incidents
are not especially onerous these two partnerships should be considered as
a convenient alternative to the corporation since they are less burdensome
in statutory requisites, while offering the same advantages to a group desir-
ing to operate a close business.
James A. Matthews, Jr.
CREDITORS' RIGHTS-ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE-A POTENTIAL POLICY CONFLICT WITH THE FEDERAL
BANKRUPTCY ACT.
Introduction.
Today, as in the past, the lender of money often seeks to protect his
advance by obtaining a security interest in some asset of his debtor. Prior
to the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in Pennsylvania, there
were a number of ways in which the creditor could achieve this protection.1
It was not impossible for him to so perfect his security interest that he
obtained by forming under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 171 (Supp. 1956) or the Uniform Partnership Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1
(Supp. 1956). Neither of these organizations are taxable as a corporation by the state
but they may still make their election under the Internal Revenue Code to claim such
benefits as the operating loss carryover or the accumulation of capital).
76. Latty, The Close Corporation, 34 N.C.L. REv. 432, n. 90 (1956).
1. These Pennsylvania statutory security devices, all repealed by the Uniform
Commercial Code, in 1953, are fairly representative of the security devices avai!able in
the non-Code state: Factor's Lien: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 221-229 (Supp. 1948) ;
Chattel Mortgages: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 940 (Supp. 1948) Transfer of Accounts
Receivable: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 561-563 (Supp. 1948) Trust Receipts: PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 551-570 (Supp. 1948) ; Conditional Sales: PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
69, §§ 361-504 (Supp. 1948). Pennsylvania also had the less common bailment lease
device: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, §§ 511-514 (Supp. 1948).
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could prevail over levies of other creditors and even subordinate the
equities of bona fide purchasers. However, depending upon the form of
security device chosen and the type of interest chosen to be secured such
perfection as against other creditors was often not only difficult of achieve-
ment, but of distressingly unpredictable validity in bankruptcy situations.
The enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, however, made
available to the creditor seeking a protected security interest an ease of
perfection heretofore unknown.2 The new facility in obtaining a perfected
security interest in inventory and accounts receivable perhaps best illus-
trates the break with the past.
This new statutory scheme allowing such unprecedented ease of per-
fection must now take its place in the application of section 60a of the
Bankruptcy Act which declares state law to be controlling in the deter-
mination of whether or not a transfer has been so perfected as to prevail
in bankruptcy under the lien-creditor test of the Bankruptcy Act. In
view of the radical liberalizing provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code allowing easy perfection, the question may well arise
whether the policy of the Bankruptcy Act to "assure equality of distribu-
tion among creditors" 8 as embodied in section 60a might be found to be
no longer compatible with the test of state law to determine perfection. To
that inquiry this comment is directed.
I.
NON-CODE METHODS OF PERFECTION.
The creditor seeking a perfected security interest in the assets of his
debtor has long been made to wend a tortuous legal path in order to
realize his goal.4 Perfection was most easily achieved, of course, by means
of the pledge which entailed no more than possession of the collateral by
the lender to perfect his interest. Such possession embodied and basically
illustrated the dual requirement which the common law demanded to make
chattel security effective: notoriety to protect creditors (i.e., prevention of
the "secret lien") and dominion inconsistent with a power of disposition
in the debtor.5  The stringent requirement of possession in the lender
made the pledge of little value in commercial financing where free disposi-
2. See Everett, Securing Security, 16 Law & CONTEMP. PROB. 49, 74 (1951);
Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 27, 28 (1951).
3. Wilson v. Cooper, 215 Ky. 668, 287 S.W. 364, 368 (1926).
4. Whether this is attributable to a fetishistic judicial adherence to common-law
lien and property concepts, or to a broad animosity towards the very idea of perfection
motivated by a realization of the propensities of creditors to overreach is a question
availing itself of no easy answer. See Gilmore and Axelrod, Chattel Security: 1, 67
YALE L. J. 517, 532-533 (1948) for an investigation of the historical basis behind the
obstacles faced by the creditor seeking a secured interest.
5. The common-law exception of "return for a temporary and limited purpose"
was codified by the UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 3(3). See also RESTATEMENT,
SECURITY § 11 (1941). Compare UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-304 which applies
the doctrine only to instruments and not to chattel paper or to goods, and states the
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tion of the goods in the hands of the debtor is essential. 6 The security
device desired demanded a freedom of disposition in the borrower, yet at
the same time, paradoxically, compliance with the common-law lien con-
cepts of lender-retention of possession. These apparently conflicting
requirements were met and merged through the device of field warehousing
-a clever effort to validate a floating lien on the shifting stock of goods
of a manufacturer. 7 Perfection through a lien on a shifting stock of goods
by means of the field warehousing device was possible, but expensive,
difficult and dangerous. Armed with common-law pledge concepts, the
courts cut a swath through the ranks of those hapless creditors who
deviated from the old technical lien requirements. s
Attempts at practical inventory financing by means of the chattel
mortgage foundered and were dragged under by the weight of the security
device's history and the limited scope for which it was intended.9 Statutes,
although freeing the chattel mortgage from certain restrictions (e.g., many
allowed an after-acquired property clause 10), nevertheless, failed to effect
rule in terms of a limited period of time (21 days), not a "limited purpose." On the
whole, the Code follows the common-law theory of perfection through transfer of
possession. UNIFORM COMM&ERCIAL CODe § 9-203(1) (a). It is to the modern extension
of the pledge (i.e., field warehousing with its attempt to validate an interest in a
shifting stock of goods under a pledge concept) that the Code brings change.
6. The manufacturer or merchant, of course, cannot allow inventory to lie dor-
mant in the hands of the lender as the common-law pledge requires without committing
commercial suicide. Unless the security device to be used allows retention of possession
and the right to sell with freedom of disposition of sales proceeds to purchase new
inventory (which would then replace the old under the lien), it is of little or no value
in commercial financing. The chattel mortgage failed to meet the problem as will be
shown.
7. The lender fulfilled the requirement of "taking possession" through a pledge
to him by the debtor of warehouse receipts representing the goods bailed in a ware-
house. The "warehouse," usually on the premises of the debtor, allowed him access
to the goods through the cumbersome process of pledging new inventory as it came in
and using the new receipts as collateral to release the lender's security interest in the
goods ready for final disposition. Part of the premises of the debtor must be leased by
the lender and signs posted to indicate the occupation; an agent of the creditor must
take possession and maintain strict control of the premises. See Birnbaum, Form and
Substance in Field Warehousing, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 579 (1948).
8. A "lack of good faith" in the transaction was the test usually employed to
invalidate the attempted floating lien on a shifting stock of goods through the medium
of field warehousing. Some of the more common technical failings considered by the
courts as indicia of such lack of good faith are failure to segregate the goods, lack of
signs, failure to tag the goods, failure to provide an independent warehouseman and
permitting the debtor to remain in possession of the leased premises. See cases collected
in Friedman, Field Warehousing, 42 COLUM. L. Riv. 991, 999 n.43 (1942).
9. From the time of Elizabeth possession of the collateral by the vendor, grantor, cr
mortgagor created the risk that the conveyance would be declared fraudulent as
against creditors. Such possession was likewise proscribed in the later Bankruptcy Act
of James I. The recording acts apparently gave the chattel mortgage efficacy. In view of
the control exercised by the mortgagor, it was accepted with inimical reluctance by
the courts. Originally intended to provide security in goods at rest in the permanent
possession of the borrower, attempts to modernize the chattel mortgage with a power
of sale and freedom of disposition of the proceeds, right to use of the goods, and/or
an after-acquired property clause in order to get a floating lien past the courts under
the guise of a chattel mortgage have failed. See note 14 infra. See Gilmore and Axel-
rod, Chattel Security: I, 57 YALE L. J. 517, 529-534 (1948).
10. E.g. see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 940 (Supp. 1948). The statute, however,
restricted the operation of the after-acquird property clause by allowing the lien to
bind only after-acquired chattels of the same class, replacements and increases in the
produce of the chattel. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 940.3 (Supp. 1948).
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a floating lien on a shifting stock of goods." The chattel mortgage statute
allowing freedom from the duty of the debtor to account for sales proceeds
and no duty of replacement is rare. 12 Perfection under the chattel mortgage
required strict adherence to certain technical requirements such as witness-
ing and acknowledging, 1' and any attempt to deviate from the rigid
standards imposed by traditional mortgage concepts was dealt with
severely. 14 The chattel mortgage, because of such traditional restrictions,
remained, on the whole, most useful when limited to financing arrangements
not involving a floating lien. Yet, even so restricted, perfection was always
subject to numbing attacks for technical errors. 15
The trust receipt, traditionally a tripartite transaction involving a
financing agency, a seller and a buyer, was a useful device which, while
allowing the financier (usually a bank) to retain a perfected security in-
terest in the goods "entrusted" to the debtor (usually an automobile or
domestic appliance dealer), nevertheless, enabled the "trustee" to sell the
goods free of the lien which attached to the proceeds of the sale. To
achieve perfection through the trust receipt,. the courts demanded strict
compliance with certain requirements. Failure to adhere to these require-
11. The chattel mortgage, by statute, was self-liquidating if a power of sale were
allowed, i.e., the proceeds were required to be turned over to the mortgagee. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 940.6 (Supp. 1948). See In re Freaman, 84 F.Supp. 441 (D.N.H. 1949),
where, under New Hampshire law, a failure to provide for an accounting of the pro-
ceeds of property sold rendered the mortgage invalid. The courts in Miller v. Scar-
borough, 108 Wash. 646, 185 Pac. 625 (1919), and Territory ex. rel. Comm'r v.
Guerin, 140 F.Supp. 440 (D. Alaska 1956), on similar fact situations arrived at the
same conclusions. For a like holding where no statutory interpretation was involved,
see In re Marsh, 53 F.2d 400 (S.D. Idaho 1931).
12. THE UNIFORM CHATTEL MORTGAGE ACT which allowed such freedom (§ 25
(4)) was never adopted by any state and was withdrawn.
13. See note 15 infra.
14. Where the mortgagor had authority to dispose of the mortgaged property,
and to apply the proceeds as he saw fit, it was held to be such a "reservation of
dominion unfettered" as to render the chattel mortgage void as against creditors. Paul
v. Behrends Bank, 94 F.Supp. 249 (D. Alaska 1950). An after-acquired property clause
in a chattel mortgage was held invalid as against creditors, and an agreement permitting
the mortgagor to sell for his own benefit was held to render the mortgage fraudulent as
a matter of law. Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907).
Where a chattel mortgage permitted the mortgagor to sell all or any part of the
mortgaged property without accounting, it was held to impute fraud and to be void in
its entirety. Aubury v. Kochner, 18 F.2d 588 (W.D.N.Y. 1927). A chattel mortgage on
after-acquired property was held void as against creditors of the mortgagor. Prudence-
Bonds Corp. v. Thousand Island House Co., 141 Misc. 39, 252 N.Y. Supp. 60 (1930).
15. In re Hylbert, 26 F.2d 672 (E.D. Ill. 1928). (An Illinois chattel mortgage,
acknowledgement of which was certified to in mortgagor's absence without actual
notice was held to be void as against mortgagor's trustees in bankruptcy). In re 1-,ir-
rison, 109 F. Supp. 614 (D. N.J. 1953). (Affidavit of the mortgage failed to meet the
requirements of the New Jersey chattel mortgage statute). Arcady Farms Milling Co.
v. Sedler, 367 Pa. 314, 80 A.2d 845 (1951) (Signatures of mortgagors were not wit-
nessed). Dealers Credit Corp v. Rex Lumber & Suoply Co., 66 Pa. D. & C. 452 (C.P.
Wash. 1948) (No acknowledgement). Brady v. Frigidaire Sales Corp., 180 Wash.
472, 40 P.2d 166 (1935) (Acknowledgement that the chattel mortgage given was the
free and voluntary act of the corporation, but not of the officer signing was held
fatally defective). An interesting judicial exposition found in Nat'l Cash Register Co.
v. Riley Advertising System, 329 Il. 403, 160 N.E. 545, 547 (1953). seems fairly to
exemplify the attitude of the courts towards chattel mortgages: "Unless the chattel
mortgage is executed and acknowledged in strict compliance with the statute, it is void
as to third persons even though they may have notice of the existence of it."
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ments created the possibility of a judicial determination that the attempted
security device was a chattel mortgage or conditional sale resulting in its
being adjudged invalid for failure of recordation.16
Although the Uniform Trust Receipts Act 17 ushered in certain
liberalizing features, a commercially feasible floating lien on a shifting stock
of goods remained impossible because of the underlying self-liquidating
principle of the trust receipt 18 and a failure to provide an after-acquired
property clause.
It was with the development of the factor's lien that commercial
financing found its most convenient and workable security device. A
number of states in recent years have adopted "factor's acts," a modern
legislative development of the common-law factor's lien on the goods of
his principal to secure advances made to the principal. 19 Today's factor's
acts embrace any person, bank or firm which lends money on the security
of goods or merchandise, as well as the traditional selling agent.20 Con-
spicuous sign posting is often required, as well as filing of public notice
with a designated public official to bring the lien into effect. 21
The possibility of an interpretation of a factor's act so as to admit of
a floating lien on a shifting stock has been hopefully suggested.2 2  After-
acquired property clauses are permitted,23 there is no third party involved
and the goods are not hindered in their free movement about the debtor's
premises. While all this seems a forward movement to effect the desired
floating lien, nevertheless, there has been some doubt expressed as to whether
16. In re Chappel, 77 F.Supp. 573 (D.C. Ore. 1948) ; Mason v. Wylde, 308 Mass.
268, 32 N.E.2d 61.5 (1941); Habegger v. Skalla, 140 Kan. 166, 34 P.2d 113 (1934).
The financier and dealer must record a statement of trust receipt financing annually,
but the trust receipts given by the dealer need not be recorded (although recordation
is required by the UNIFORM TRUST REcIms ACT, § 8 (1)). The title to goods was
required to go directly to the banker from the seller, after which the banker, retain-
ing title in his name, would deliver the merchandise to the retailer upon a "trust"
agreement in writing to hold the goods for the "entruster" against puynent of the
sums advanced. Simons v. Northeastern Finance Corp., 271 Mass. 285, 171 N.E. 643(1930). The harsh rule which rendered invalid any trust receipt transaction which
allowed the title to go from the seller straight to the lender was relaxed by the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act under which the source of title is immaterial. LjNoIlF I
TRUST REcEIPrs ACT § 2. The Uniform Act is applicable to new financing of new
acquisitions only. In re Chappell, 77 F. Supp. 573 (D.C. Ore. 1948). It cannot be used
in a loan situation the proper device for which is the chattel mortgage. UNIVORm TRUST
RECEIPTS ACT § 2 (1).
17. Adopted in Pennsylvania in 1941: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 561 (Supp. 1948).
See Gilmore, Chattel Security: II, 57 YALE L.J. 761, 765-768 (1954).
18. Note, however, the liberalizing provisions of § 10 of the Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts Act.
19. Gilmore, Chattel' Security: II, 57 YALE L.J. 761, 768 (1948). The usual
factor's lien act allows a general lien on goods specified in pledge statements which
may secure antecedent and future indebtedness. A notice of lien is all that need be filed.
It is, in effect, field warehousing stripped of certain commercially objectionable re-
quirements such as segregation and possession. See generally Silverman, Factoring:
Its Legal Aspects and Economic Justification, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 602 (1948).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 221 (Supp. 1948).
21. Id. at § 224.
22. Gilmore, Chattel Security: II, 57 YAIE L. J. 761, 771 (1948).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 222 (Supp. 1948).
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this will be the ultimate result after a factor's act has emerged from the
fires of judicial interpretation.2 4  The borrower usually reports at intervals
his purchases, inventory on hand and shipments.25  Statutes usually
prescribe for particularity of description of the collateral: an effective hin-
drance to a true floating lien.
This cursory review of the more frequently used security devices which
the Code purports to replace makes evident two common factors: the
difficulty of perfection because of the courts' close adherence to the rigid
technical prerequisites to perfection, and the extreme difficulty under all
these security devices of achieving a true floating lien on the shifting in-
ventory of the manufacturer or dealer, a very attractive borrowing security. 26
As the cases illustrate, the failure to achieve smooth inventory financing
by molding the floating lien to the forms of the old security devices has
not been due to a lack of persistent, and often ingenious attempts.
The difficulties encountered by the creditor, in attempts to perfect
security interests in the inventory and equipment of the debtor have
paralleled those in the field of financing accounts receivable, the debtor's
most realizable asset.2 7 The creditor's desire to clamp a firm hold on the
accounts receivable of his debtor with a minimum of fanifare 28 can be easily
understood; and just as apparent is the animosity of the unsecured creditor
towards such financing, especially when it comes to light soon before bank-
ruptcy. The position of the courts,29 which certainly should not have been
24. Gilmore, Chattel Security: II, 57 YALE L. 3. 761, 771 (1948). Some factor's
lien statutes seems to require formal pledging or consignment of after-acquired prop-
erty. Everett, Securing Security, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., 49, 62 (1951).
25. Burman, Practical Aspects of Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing,
13 LAW & CONTMP. PROB. 554, 564 (1948).
26. This non-Code animosity towards inventory and accounts receivable financing
and, apparently, perfection of chattel security in general is considered by Birnbaum,
an advisor to Reporters for Article 9, in Article 9-A Restatement and Revision of
Chattel Security, Wis. L. Rxv. 348, 350, (1952), where he notes that the courts were
always "assiduously ready to search for technical reasons" to invalidate chattel security.The explanation is in the hands of the legal historian. Gilmore and Axelrod, Chattel
Security: I, 57 YALE L.J. 517, 531-536 (1948).
27. The interpretation of the 1938 Chandler Amendment to Section 60a of the
Bankruptcy Act in Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434(1943), seemed to spell the end to effective (non-notification) accounts receivable
financing as well as to completely abolish those security devices allowing sale of
secured goods free of lien (e.g., factor's liens, "wholesale" chattel mortgages, condi-
tional sale contracts on goods for resale, etc.). Legislative action and revision of the
Bankruptcy Act, however, have made the problem, once the source of a very lively
controversy, now largely pass6. See Countryman, The Secured Transactions Article of
the Commercial Code and Section 60 of the Bantkruptcy Act, 16 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 76, 79-83 (1951); Kupfer and Livingston, Corn Exchange National Bank and
Trust Co. v. Klauder Revisited: The Aftermath of Its Implications, 32 VA. L. REv.
510 (1946).
28. Such financing is often considered the harbinger of bankruptcy in business
circles. Everett, Securing Security, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 49, 59 (1951) : Kripke,
The "Secured Transactions" Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 VA. L.
REv. 577, 581 (1949).
29. The attitude of the courts towards accounts receivable financing has been
characterized as a "hostility" grounded "largely on a dislike of secret liens." Birn-
baum, Article 9-A Restatement and Revision of Chattel Security, Wis. L. REv. 348,
365 (1952). Note the view of the Supreme Court towards accounts receivable financing
in Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
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difficult to foresee, was embodied in the famous decision of Benedict v.
Ratner. °
In the Ratner case there had been an assignment to the creditor, four
months and three days before the commencement of bankruptcy proceed-
ings, of all accounts present and future of the debtor as collateral for
certain loans. The trustee in bankruptcy resisted the petition of the creditor
that the accounts collected be paid over to him on the grounds, inter alia,
that such transfer was a voidable preference under the Bankruptcy Act.
Although the receivables were to be collected by the company, the creditor
was given the right, at any time, to demand a full disclosure of the business
and financial conditions of the company, to require that all amounts coliected
be applied in payment of his loans and to enforce the assignment although
no loan had matured. Nonetheless, the situation was one eminently con-
venient from a business standpoint for the debtor-manufacturer and in-
volved a minimum of interference with the smooth functioning of its
business: it was not required to replace accounts collected by other collateral
of equal value, nor to account in any way to the creditor for the disposition
of the collections. The much-feared interpretation that accounts receivable
financing is purported to carry with it, that of a confession of insolvency,
was avoided by keeping the existence of the assignment secret.
The Supreme Court, following a path well marked by over one hundred
years of decisions holding invalid chattel mortgages with a right to sale
which failed to provide a duty to account for proceeds,81 made short shrift
of the opinion of the district judge which stated that the title of the creditor
was so perfected as to be good as against a supervening bankruptcy.
Eschewing the approach, as not applicable to the facts, that the assignment
was invalid through operation of the doctrine of ostensible ownership, the
rationale of the court turned rather on the fact that the assignment had
not met that sine qua non of the common-law lien definition: ". . . reser-
vation of dominion inconsistent with the effective disposition of title.
" 32
Thus another, and perhaps the most commercially useful of all the
types of security financing, braced for a long and difficult struggle to
achieve a practicable perfection.3
Buttressed by Ratner, the courts in a variety of jurisdictions began to
freely strike down accounts receivable financing, often on tenuous technical
refinements.8 4 The rigors of the rule were further intensified by one deci-
30. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
31. Id. at 360.
32. Id. at 364.
33. "This case provided unsecured creditors with a weapon for striking down
poorly managed arrangements, which when its force was avoided by good management,
did them very little good." Pemberton, Notice Filing For Accounts Receivable, 13
LAW & CONTtMP. PROB. 643, 660 (1948).
34. Irving Trust Co. v. Finance Service Co., 63 F.2d 641 (2d Cir. 1933) ; Lichten-
berg v. Harvey, 57 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1932) ; In re Borok, 50 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1931) ;
Lee v. State Bank and Trust Co., 38 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1930) (Where debtors freedom
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sion which interpreted Ratner to require "absolute dominion" over the
accounts to achieve perfection. 5 Although in the great majority of juris-
dictions, neither the courts nor the legislatures have yet specifically accepted
or rejected Ratner, it nonetheless hovers threateningly, a potential trap
to the lien of any assignee derelict in policing the accounts of his debtor.86
II.
THE CODE.
The innovations wrought by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code in the field of secured financing are as involved as they are numer-
ous. 37 The general effect of its impact upon the extant security financing
arrangements of any jurisdiction would be to abolish and relax the rules
and technical formalities-the common-law vestiges heretofore rigorously
enforced as prerequisites to achievement of a perfected security interest.
In short, the essence of Article 9 appears to be ease of perfection. The
long-suffering secured creditor belatedly carries the field.
The more iconoclastic changes brought about by the Code strike di-
rectly at the heart of the requirements that in the past have most effectively
hindered sure and easy perfection. No longer does the floating lien on a
shifting stock become a hazardous venture of doubtful stability in bank-
ruptcy situations. Inventory financing is now fully validated by those
sections of the Code permitting after-acquired property and future advances
of disposition of returned goods rendered the security interest invalid) ; Walradt v.
Miller, 45 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1930) ; In re. Saxon Coffee Co., 22 F.2d 999 (Md. Cir.
1927) ; In re Steele, 122 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.N.C. 1954) ; Thole v. Delmonico Garage,
47 F. Supp. 601 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) ; Inre Almond Jones Co., 13 F.2d 152 (D.Md. 1926) ;
In re Edelstein, 18 F.2d 963 (S.D.N.Y. 1926), aff'd, 16 F.2d 986 (4th Cir. 1927).
Courts have upheld such assignments where they have met the Ratner requirements.
Second Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 189 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1951) ; In re Bernard, 38 F.2d
40 (2d Cir. 1930) ; In re Monumental Shoe Mfg. Co., 14 F.2d 549 (Md. Cir. 1926) ;
Eiseman v. Curtis Companies, 231 Wis. 260, 285 N.W. 747 (1939). In re Pusey, 122
F.2d 606 (3d Cir. 1941), seemed to show a Pennsylvania rapport with Ratner.
35.. Zydney v. N.Y. Credit Men's Ass'n., 113 F.2d 986, 988 (2d Cir. 1940)
(dictum).
36. Ratner has been characterized as "a sword of Damocles hanging over many
legitimate security devices." Pemberton, Notice Filing For Assignment of Accounts
Receivable, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 643, 660 (1948). The only answer to Ratner
seems to lie in the establishment of an involved mechanism with inspectors and cus-
todians to receive collections, special accounts and records, periodic audits and special
arrangements to handle returned merchandise. See note 33 supra. See Kripke, The
"Secured Transactions" Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 VA. L. REv.
579, 591 (1949). The Ratner decision, of course, insofar as the "reservation of do-
minion" principle is concerned, applies directly to inventory financing as well. See Lee
v. State Bank and Trust Co., 38 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1930).
37. It is not within the scope of this comment to explore the mutations of Article
9 upon the pre-1953 security law of Pennsylvania, or the revisions upon the extant law
in other jurisdictions its enactment would bring; there is no dearth of articles on ihe
subject: see Birnbaum, Article 9-A Restatement and Revision of Chattel Security.
Wis. L. Rv. 348 349, n.2 (1952). Birnbaum declares that the three major policies of
Article 9 are: (1)l to facilitate the legal perfection of security interests; (2) to leave
unaffected any procedures which give practical protection (i.e., although the rules of
Ratner are no longer legal requisites, they may remain practical necessities) ; and (3)
to disregard all distinctions based solely on form or technicality.
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clauses, a8 by the priority given future advances, 9 the allowing of disposition
of secured goods without accounting," and the enactment of a filing system
requiring a statement giving merely a general description of the collateral. 41
The long-fought-for lien on a shifting stock, unsuccessfully attempted in
the past under so many guises, is at last recognized. The Ratner decision
is discarded, 42 and accounts receivable financing is made practicable and
consonant with the desires of the business world, unhampered legally by
awkward policing rules.
The varied forms for different commercial transactions under which
security financing was conducted in the past 4 are swept free of their formal
distinctions and merged, 44 the requisites for perfection reduced to a basic
minimum, 45 and the emphasis placed on the type of property involved and
the effects of the transaction rather than on formalistic common-law dif-
ferences.46  Perfection of security interests on equipment, inventory and
accounts receivable, and the consumer financing field, is made cheap and
easy. But most important it is made sure: under the Code, for example,
airtight liens on all the assets of the borrower could be effected with an
absolute minimum of risk and uncertainty in supervening bankruptcy.
Herein, indeed, lies the break with the past.
III.
THE FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY ACT AND A POTENTIAL POLICY CONFLICT.
The principle expressed in Wilson v. Cooper 47 that "the primary pur-
pose of the Bankruptcy Act is to secure equality among creditors and to pre-
vent any preference between them . . ,, 48 is one often reiterated by the
38. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204 (3) and (5). The danger of this section
running afoul of that provision of the Bankruptcy Act which makes certain transac-
tions for antecedent debt voidable as preferences, is avoided by the effect of § 9-108
(2), the Code's famous "new value" provision considered in greater detail infra p. 406.
39. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312 (3).
40. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-205.
41. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODS §§ 9-110, 9-402 (1).
42. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-205. The cases following Ratner are also
specifically repealed by the Code: see comment 4.
43. Each of whose individual integrity was closely guarded by the threat of loss
of lien for making the wrong choice. In re Lake's Laundry, 79 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1935) ;Quinn v. Bancroft-Jones Corp., 18 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1927). In re Benson, 102 F. Supp.
166 (W.D. Pa. 1952). This danger is of course obviated by the Code's merging of the
old security devices. "A secured party who has complied with this Article, need no
longer fear the loss of his security interest because he has called it by one name
rather than another and so has filed in the wrong set of books." Comment to UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101.
44. Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 27, 33-34 (1951).
45. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-110, 9-201, 9-203 (1), 9-401. Formalities of
the past such as the signature of the secured party, acknowledgement, affidavit of good
faith and the like, which though technical were vital (see footnote 15 supra) have been
done away with.
46. Comment to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101; §§ 9-102, 9-109.
47. 215 Ky. 668, 287 S.W. 364 (1926).,
48. 287 S.W. at 368.
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courts.49  Section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act defines what elements con-
stitute a voidable preference in bankruptcy o and lays down the crucial
rule to determine when such a transfer has been made:
.* . a transfer of property other than real property shall be deemed
to have been made or suffered at the time when it became so far per-
fected that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal
or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become superior
to the rights of the transferee." "I
If such perfection is not attained, the transfer, according to section
60a( 2 ) "shall be deemed to have been made immediately before the filing of
the petition." 52 The effectiveness of this latter provision in striking down
attempted security devices in a bankruptcy action is obvious: by failing to
so perfect, the would-be secured creditor finds his transfer suddenly meeting
a number of the requisite elements of a voidable preference under 60a(1).
The transfer is brought within the four-month period and is considered
as having been made when the debtor was insolvent. The burden of show-
ing the transferee's "cause to believe" the insolvency of the debtor will be
considerably alleviated since such non-perfected transfers are 'treated as
if made "contemporaneously with bankruptcy," 53 and most striking of all,
the transfer will be considered as made for an antecdent debt even though
made for a contemporaneous consideration.54
It is apparent that effective perfection is of the essence to prevent
having a security arrangement avoided as preferential in bankruptcy. The
crucial question which naturally arises is: what law governs to determine
whether or not a security arrangement has been so perfected as to with-
stand the onslaught of section 60a? The answer provided by the Bank-
ruptcy Act and mirrored by a number of bankruptcy cases 5 is simply
49. Sampsell v. Imperial Paper and Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941) ; In re F.P.
Newport Corp., 123 F.Supp. 95 (S.D. Cal. 1954) ; Canright v. General Finance Corp.,
35 F.Supp. 841 (E.D. Ill. 1940) ; Becker v. Crabb's Trustee, 231 Ky. 354, 21 S.W.2d
439 (1929). The machinery set up to effect his purpose is embodied in sections 60, 67
and 70 of the Bankruptcy Act. See 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 743 (14th ed. 1956).
50. "A preference is a transfer, as defined in this Act, of any of the property of a
debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt. mac*e
or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within 4 months before the filing by or
against him of the petition initiating a proceedings under this Act, the effect of which
transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
some other creditor of the same class." 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1)
(1952).
51. 52 STATr. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1952).
52. Matter of Cox, 132 F.2d 881, 883 (7th Cir. 1943).
53. Id. at 883.
54. Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434, 437
(1943). Note exception under 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(7) (1952'.
55. Corn Exchange Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943);
Matter of Cox, 132 F.2d 881 (7th Cir. 1943) (unrecorded m.crtgage under Indiana
law) ; Harrison v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 124 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1942) ; In re Turley,
92 F.2d 944 (7th Cir. 1938) ; In re Patterson, 139 F.Supp. 830 (D. Mo. 1956);
Matter of Markert, 45 F.Supp. 661 (D. Mass. 1942) (possession of after-acquired
personal property under chattel mortgage: Massachusetts law). See cases collected in 3
COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 913, n.5 (14th ed. 1956).
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that state law governs. The courts look at the security arrangement em-
ployed and decide whether, under the applicable state law, the transfer has
been so perfected as to subordinate the rights of subsequent lien creditors.
In view of the great obstacles state law put in the path of the creditor
desiring a perfected security interest prior to the enactment of the Code,
and still does in a non-Code state (as reviewed supra), small wonder the
secured creditor's position was always a doubtful and hazardous one in a
contemplated bankruptcy contest. Non-Code methods of perfection,
especially where accounts receivable or inventory financing arrangements
were attempted, were so involved, formalistic and shadowed with the
historical animosity towards perfection, and the slightest errors were seized
upon with such eagerness by the courts, that the threat of attack in
bankruptcy was a frightening one indeed to any secured creditor.
The principle that state law governs to determine perfection under
section 60a is one that grew up and was applied side by side with state
laws which made true perfection no mean accomplishment, especially in
the accounts receivable and inventory financing fields. The Bankruptcy
Act's underlying theory of "equality of distribution" was neatly com-
plemented by the rule of state law governing perfection, for the state laws,
on the whole, served to keep the secured creditor in his place. To
perfect his interest was often an expensive, involved and awkward affair,
ringed with fatal pitfalls in the guise of legal requirements, and worst of
all, it was never predictable and rarely reasonably sure to withstand attack
in a bankruptcy action. In short, the state law provision was framed in
a legal atmosphere certainly conducive to "equality of distribution." The
difficulties and risks faced by the would-be secured creditor brought about
two inevitable results: first, the discouraging of attempts to perfect (espe-
cially to get a security interest in accounts receivable or on a shifting
inventory) because of the expense and the cumbersome, commercially
unfeasible technicalities required; and, secondly, always affording the
ravenous unsecured creditors a good opportunity to tear down the shaky
legal edifices chosen to hold them at bay. To say that they were often
successful in their attacks is understatement. Hand in hand, that formi-
dable alliance of section 60a's state law proviso and the states' common-law
security concepts effectively tended to curtail the operations of the secured
creditor.
With the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code and its radical
Article 9 on Secured Transactions, allowing a heretofore unknown ease
and certainty of perfection, and sweeping away the restrictive rules of
chattel security that preceded it, the broad outlines of a potential policy
conflict become discernible. Can the Bankruptcy Act effectively fulfill its
policy of "equality of distribution" in league with this statutory innovation
whose pervading theme is declared to be "freedom of contract" 56 between
56. See comment to UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101.
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the parties to the security agreement? The results of this liberalizing policy
of Article 9 in many cases should not be difficult to foresee. The lenders,
"a class never noted for its propensity to underreach where overreaching
is not forbidden by law,"' 57 may now easily and surely effect valid liens on
almost all the assets of the debtor, including his accounts receivable and
shifting inventory.'5 The position of the unsecured creditors in bankruptcy
situations under Article 9 may be a sorry one indeed. The grandiose ex-
pression of "equality of distribution among creditors" may ring hollow
if there is in fact nothing left unencumbered to distribute. With the
restrictions gone that were at one time thrown in the path of the would-be
overreaching creditor, with the various legal stratagems once wielded so
effectively by the unsecured creditor now rendered ineffective, will it be
enough to explain to him that the Bankruptcy Act leaves it to state law
to determine perfection, cite Matter of Cox and forthwith relegate him to
the wailing wall of the unsecured creditors? The efficacy of any bankruptcy
law can be effectively obviated by facile perfection. The question resolves
itself simply to this: will Congress allow this state law clause to continue
in force (thereby in effect permitting the underlying theory of the act to
be defeated by one of its own clauses), or will the test of state law be
withdrawn? The answer, of course, will be found in those decisions giving
a clearer enunciation of the Bankruptcy Act's policy towards a state law
which permits ease of perfection to a degree certainly not contemplated
at the time of the drafting of the state law provision of the Bankruptcy
Act.
Besides these objections to Article 9 on broad policy grounds, there
exists a more specific potential conflict between the Code and the Bankruptcy
Act in the Code's "new value" provision.59 One of the dangers of an
after-acquired property agreement in the past was that, in case of bank-
ruptcy, the transfers of property made pursuant to the agreement might be
considered as for an antecedent debt, thus meeting an important element
of a voidable preference as defined in section 60a(l) of the Bankv-uptcy
Act. The Code, apparently attempting to shield its validation of after-
acquired property clauses 60 from such a line of attack, provides that:
"Where a secured party makes an advance, incurs an obligation
or otherwise gives new value which is to be secured in whole or, in
part by after-acquired property his security interest in the after-
acquired collateral shall be deemed to be taken for such new value
57. Gilmore, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW
& CONTMP. PROB. 27, 36 (1951).
58. The socio-economic arguments for and against Article 9 have been considered
by more than one commentator. Although interesting, they are not germane. See Gil-
more, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTrMP.
PROB. 27 (1951) for the contentions of what the author labels the "Left" and "Right"
in the controversy.
59. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-108 (2).
60. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204 (1) and (3).
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and not as security for a pre-existing claim if the debtor acquires his
rights in such collateral either in the ordinary course of his business
or under a contract of purchase made within a reasonable time after
the making of the security agreement and pursuant thereto." 61
At first blush this provision appears to fly in the teeth of section 60a
(1), the Bankruptcy Act's definition of preferences. The possibility of a
direct clash between the Code and the Bankruptcy Act on this point has
not gone unnoticed. 62 In their comment to the section the sponsors state
their opinion that section 9-108(2) would stand up in bankruptcy; 3 "others
are not so sure." 64 The Code's interpretation of such transfers in accounts
receivable and inventory financing as being for "new value" is certainly a
fictitious one which may well fail to withstand 60a(1).6
Leo Kearney O'Drudy, Jr.
61. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-108 (2).
62. "Insofar as this provision attempts to change an uncomfortable fact by assert-
ing the contrary, the draftsmanship is unfortunate. Assuming that the intent is to state
that the uncomfortable fact shall not have its ordinary legal consequences, it may be
questioned whether any state legislation can affect the definition of preference in the
Bankruptcy Act." Kripke, The Modernization of Commercial Security Under the Uni-form Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONThMP. PROB. 183, 195 (1951). See also Birn-
baum, Article 9-A Restatement and Revision of Chattel Security, Wis. L. REV. 348, 357
1952) ; Kripke, The "Secured Transactions, Provisions of the Uniform Commercial
ode, 35 VA. L. REv. 577, 604 (1949). That a contrary argument might be made is
suggested in Everett, Securing Security, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 49, 55 (1951).
63. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-108, comment 3: "The determination of
when a transfer is for an antecedent debt is left by the Bankruptcy Act to state law."
64. Kupfer, Accounts Receivable, Trust Receipt, and Related Types of Financing
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 TEMP. L. Q. 278, 281 (1953).
65. The Federal Bankruptcy Act is superior to all state law on the subject. Moore
v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4 (1931) ; In re Driscoll, 127 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.Cal. 1954).
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